![]() Different tests scenarios are verified under a man attack in the MITM environment, to intercept or capture the traffic sent and received during web transactions. this problem, the computer security is a rising trend, generating new possibilities to mitigate vulnerabilities when handling the information in a transactional web site an analysis is made of performance, weaknesses and strengths of the HSTS standard, as a security complement of the SSL/TLS protocol. However, every time more security issues arise. The transactional websites and services on the cloud, have actually become the most used browsers, thanks to their portability and ease of use, with a significant increase in the development of cloud solutions, implementing digital contexts under the 4.0 web, which generated an increase of possibilities for transactions of different types. In our experiments we show that our approach correctly recognizes known variants of WebInject-based malware and successfully extracts the WebInject targets. We evaluated Prometheus against real-world, online websites and a dataset of distinct variants of financial trojans. Furthermore, it is able to extract the WebInject targets by using memory forensic techniques. Prometheus is able to identify the injection operations performed by malware, and generate signatures based on the injection behavior. In this paper we propose Prometheus, an automatic system that is able to analyze trojans that base their attack technique on DOM modifications. ![]() From a technical point of view such malware is equipped with a functionality, called WebInject, that exploits API hooking techniques to intercept all sensitive data in a browser context and modify web pages on infected hosts. Furthermore, these trojans are sold on underground markets along with automatic frameworks that include web-based administration panels, builders and customization procedures. The number of families and variants observed increased exponentially in the last years. Nowadays Information stealers are reaching high levels of sophistication. As a side result, we also transform our collected knowledge into a plug-in for the Volatility Framework that extends the functionality of apihooks within the scope of browsers. How do they handle that? Wouldn't it be great to see the mitigation in the fi rst possible layer? We consider this as a topic for discussion. Moreover, security solutions offer various browser protections that work very well against existing methods. We are pleased to see that the ease of implementing hijacking methods is diminishing, and that attackers are under constant pressure to adopt changes. ![]() In our presentation we will guide the audience through an overview of the techniques used by major banking trojans in the wild. ![]() Though it might not have been the primary intent of the developers, the custom implementation of its SSL functionality has resulted in a cat-and-mouse game thanks to the fact that the attack points are unexported and change regularly. Finally, cybercrooks seem to have the greatest trouble adapting their hooks in Google Chrome. Moving to Microsoft Edge, the browser's developers have made their best efforts to mitigate arbitrary code execution, using technologies like Code Integrity Guard (CIG) and Arbitrary Code Guard (ACG), but the focus is on stopping exploitation of the browser itself, rather than preventing execution of injected code delivered by a remote malicious process. It has been more than seven years now since the infamous Zeus bot fi rst successfully took advantage of Mozilla Firefox by hooking specifi c exported functions, and the same approach has been widely used by others ever since. These goals are usually achieved by placing malicious code at certain addresses within a browser process. ![]() They are interested in adjusting the behaviour of the browsers for their purposes, namely intercepting the content of web forms, modifying server responses manifested as webinjects, and confi rming validity of spoofed SSL certifi cates. With the ever-increasing use of banking-related services on the web, browsers have naturally drawn the attention of malware authors. ![]()
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